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The purpose of this thesis is to determine the appropriateness and adequacy of the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) acquisition planning practices to effectively meet 
the requirements of the AFP Modernization Program (AFPMP).  The AFP Modernization 
Act of 1995 mandated the 15-year modernization of the AFP pursuant to Republic Act 
(RA) 7898.  Consequently, the Department of National Defense (DND) issued Circular 
No. 1, also known as the Implementing Guidelines, Rules and Regulations (IGRR) to 
provide the policies and procedures for the AFPMP.  Acquisition planning is key to the 
success of an acquisition because it provides the overall strategy for accomplishing and 
managing the acquisition.  It is a formal documentation of the approach to satisfy the 
need of the warfighter, optimize resources, and fulfill the policy requirements of the 
proposed acquisition.  In the AFP, planning for acquisitions depends on the Five-Year 
Rolling Plan, which contains the list of AFPMP projects and form the basis for the 
formulation of the Circular of Requirements (CORs).  The circular does not elaborate on 
how to develop the CORs or the Bid Evaluation Plans (BEPs), a document similar to the 
source selection plan.  This thesis evaluated AFP acquisition processes to determine the 
adequacy of AFP acquisition planning practices to adequately meet the needs of the 
AFPMP.  However, the study found that acquisition plans are not even a requirement for 
the AFPMP projects and it is not mentioned in any of the other attendant documents to 
RA 7898 or to the IGRR.  The study identified other issues that impact on acquisition 
planning for the AFPMP, which include lack of an acquisition organization, absence of a 
skilled acquisition workforce, no acquisition category designations for AFPMP projects, 
and lack of a single, coherent regulation that pertains to AFP weapon system acquisitions.  
The study then recommended acquisition plans to be a requirement for all AFPMP 
acquisitions and the adoption of the acquisition plan format in the FAR as a first step to 
the conduct of acquisition planning for AFPMP projects.  With an acquisition plan that 
provides a logical and systematic approach for meeting the AFP need, the chance of 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this research paper is to determine the appropriateness and 
adequacy of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) acquisition planning to 
effectively meet the requirements of the AFP Modernization Program (AFPMP).  To do 
this, existing laws, rules, and regulations pertaining to AFP acquisitions will be evaluated 
in so far as relevant acquisition planning processes are concerned.  This study will then 
assess the acquisition systems and processes of the defense establishments of other 
countries and provide an analysis of these systems and processes vis-à-vis that of the AFP 
to determine problem areas in AFP acquisition planning.  Finally, this paper intends to 
provide a guide to acquisition planning that is applicable and suitable for the AFPMP. 
B. BENEFIT OF THE STUDY 
The paper is intended to benefit the Philippine Defense Establishment, in 
particular its major services, which undertake the actual acquisition planning and are 
tasked to implement their respective modernization programs pursuant to DND Circular 
Number 1.  To this end, the paper could serve as a springboard for the formulation of 
more generic guidelines to acquisition planning that can be utilized by the major services 
of the AFP in all its acquisitions and not just for the AFPMP. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To accomplish the purpose of this paper, fundamental research questions were 
developed. The primary research question is: “Is acquisition planning as currently 
practiced in the AFP adequate to meet the requirements of the AFP Modernization 
Program?” 
The subsidiary research questions that will provide a guide to answering the 
primary question are: 
a) What laws, rules and regulations impact acquisition planning for the 
AFPMP? 
b) How is acquisition planning practiced in the AFP and how is it different 
from acquisition planning for the AFPMP? 
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c) What are the attendant problems that have been associated with current 
AFP acquisition planning practices and how does it affect the AFPMP? 
d) How is acquisition planning practiced in other countries, particularly in 
the United States (US)? 
e) What changes, if any, can be made to appropriate laws or regulations to 
make acquisition planning more responsive to the AFPMP requirements? 
 D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of this thesis will be limited to the development of a guide to 
acquisition planning for the AFPMP.  Pertinent Philippine laws, rules and regulations that 
impact on acquisition planning will be examined to establish its relevance to a more 
effective acquisition planning for the AFPMP.  This paper does not intend to solve other 
issues or problems affecting the implementation of the AFPMP, nor does it intend to 
supersede Department of National Defense (DND) Circular Number 1, implementing 
guidelines, rules, and regulations (IGRR) for the AFPMP.  This study merely tries to 
provide for a more systematic process to acquisition planning than what currently exists 
in the Philippine Defense establishment, if it is so warranted.  This thesis will conclude 
with a recommendation for adoption of a guide to acquisition planning and provide 
suggestions for amending rules and regulations as appropriate. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
The author followed the traditional way of conducting research by initially 
extracting data from previous literature on the subject as well as existing laws, rules, and 
regulations regarding the AFPMP.  Online library catalogs and periodical databases were 
also searched.  Relevant books, articles and other documents are cited as a result of these 
literature searches and are in the List of References.  Interviews were also conducted to 
gather first hand data from key AFP officials and practitioners.  These were subsequently 
analyzed using both empirical and subjective assessment to determine whether there is 
indeed a need for a more appropriate and structured acquisition planning process for the 
AFPMP. 
F. DEFINITIONS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND ACRONYMS 
For purposes of clarity and better understanding, the terms below are offered with 
their corresponding definitions or meaning: 
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Acquisition Plan – a formal written document reflecting the specific actions 
necessary to execute the approach established in the approved acquisition strategy and 
guiding contractual implementation. 
Acquisition Planning – the process by which the efforts of all personnel 
responsible for an acquisition are coordinated and integrated through a comprehensive 
plan for fulfilling the agency need in a timely manner and at a reasonable cost.  It is 
performed throughout the life cycle and includes developing an overall acquisition 
strategy for managing the acquisition and a written acquisition plan. 
AFP – Armed Forces of the Philippines 
AFP Modernization Act – refers to Republic Act No. 7898, which was enacted 
into law on 23 February 1995. 
AFP Modernization Program or AFPMP – refers to the modernization program 
submitted by the President of the Philippines pursuant to Section 7 of the AFP 
Modernization Act and approved by Congress through Joint Resolution No. 28, dated 19 
December 1996. 
AFP Modernization Act Trust Fund or AFPMATF – this refers to the trust fund 
created under Section 11 of the AFP Modernization Act. 
Bids and Awards Committees (BAC) – these are the committees constituted at 
AFP General Headquarters (GHQ) who shall conduct the public bidding and contract 
negotiations for equipment acquisition projects under the AFPMP.  Their tasks start from 
the time the Chief of Staff, AFP receives the Secretary of National Defense (SND) 
directive to undertake bidding and negotiations for a specified project or projects, to the 
approval of the formal contractual agreement by the SND. 
Bid and Evaluation Plan or BEP – this is a comprehensive document that 
contains the procedure for the acquisition of an equipment or weapons system, indicating 
the method of procurement, conduct of pre-qualification of bidders and the bidding 
proper up to and including the award of the contract. 
 Circular of Requirements or COR – is a document that defines the operational 
and technical requirement of the equipment or weapons systems to be procured.  It is 
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presented in the context of the national defense strategy, the likely operational scenarios 
and the doctrines or concept of operations in which such equipment or weapons system 
shall be employed.  It likewise includes, as applicable, force restructuring, human 
resource development, base development and other support requirements.  If the 
equipment is part of a systems-mix, this concept of systems-mix is also stated.  Similarly, 
in the case of equipment or weapon system, which has to be operationally inter-phased or 
integrated with civilian agencies of the government, the concept of inter-phase or 
integration shall be incorporated. 
Contract – is the agreement entered into and between two or more parties, signed 
by the parties, including all attachments and appendices thereto and all documents 
incorporated by reference therein. 
Equipment Acquisition – refers to the first stage in the procedure for the 
acquisition of equipment and weapons system under the capability, materiel and 
technology development component of the AFPMP.  It includes the formulation of the 
COR and the preparation of the Bid Evaluation Plan (BEP). 
Implementing Guidelines, Rules and Regulations or IGRR – refers to the 
guidelines, rules and regulations prescribed in DND Circular No. 1. 
Procurement Agency – refers to the General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the 
Philippines for acquisitions under the capability, materiel and technology development 
component of the AFPMP.  It refers to the Major Services for projects falling under the 
other components of the program. 
Weapon System – refers to a combination of one or more weapons with related 
equipment, materials, services, personnel, and means of delivery and deployment 
required for self-sufficiency.  It is the end item that will be used to perform the 
operational requirement of the capabilities to be developed or the sub-component of the 
end item. 
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This Thesis consists of five chapters.  Chapter I presents the background, purpose, 
scope and methodology of the research.  Chapter II provides a background about the 
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Philippines and a discussion of the AFP Modernization Act, the implementing guidelines, 
rules, and regulations of the Act, and other statutes, rules and regulations that affect the 
AFP Modernization Program.  This chapter also discusses the AFP acquisition process 
and planning.  Chapter III describes the defense acquisition process of three different 
countries, including that of the US, and acquisition planning as practice in the US defense 
establishment.  Chapter IV is an analysis of all the information gathered from the 
research as described in the preceding two chapters.  Finally, Chapter V presents the 
conclusions and recommendations of the study regarding the need for a guide to 
acquisition planning that is responsive to the needs of the AFPMP, answers to the 
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II.  AFP ACQUISITION PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a short profile of the Philippines that will provide basic 
information about its history, culture, government, economy, the defense establishment, 
and its people, among others.  It then provides a literature review on the AFP acquisition 
process for the AFPMP with focus on acquisition planning.  It contains a review of the 
pertinent laws, statutes, rules, and regulations governing the program, and a description 
of the acquisition process.   This chapter endeavors to establish the general context within 
which the process of acquisition is formulated as well as the basis for acquisition 
planning. 
B. THE PHILIPPINES IN A NUTSHELL 
The Philippines is the third largest English-speaking country in the world with an 
estimated population of 80 million.  Although Pilipino is the national language, English is 
the language normally used for business and legal transactions.  The country has over a 
hundred ethnic groups and a mixture of foreign influences, which have molded a unique 
Filipino culture. The Philippine archipelago is geographically located between China and 
Borneo and consists of 7,107 islands including Luzon, Vizayas and Mindanao.  The city 
of Manila is located in the island of Luzon. There are 14 regions, 73 provinces and 60 
cities across the country.  The climate is tropical with three seasons: wet, cool and dry.  
The Philippine education is patterned after the American system, with English as 
the medium of instruction.  There are a number of foreign schools with study programs 
similar to those in the United States.  
The Philippines is the only country in Asia that is predominantly Christian with 
80 percent of its population belonging to the Catholic faith.  Other religions practiced are 
Islam and Protestantism.  
Since the ratification of the new Philippine Constitution in early 1987, the country 
has now gone back to a democratic system of government.  It has a presidential form of 
government much like in the United States of America.  The economy is basically light 
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industry and agriculture; the chief products are rice, corn, coconut, pineapple and sugar. 
The country is rich in copper, cobalt, nickel, silver, iron, and gold. It has well-developed 
industries in food processing, textiles, clothing, wood, forest products and home 
appliances, with fast-growing aquaculture, microcircuit, garments and furniture sectors. 
C. THE PHILIPPINE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT 
1. Background 
The Philippine Department of National Defense (DND), currently headed by 
Secretary Angelo T. Reyes, was formerly organized on November 1, 1939, pursuant to 
Executive Order No. 230, to implement the National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act 
No. 1) passed by the National Assembly on December 31, 1935 and Commonwealth Act 
No. 340 creating the Department.  It is tasked with the responsibility of providing the 
necessary protection of the State against external and internal threats; directing, planning 
and supervising the National Defense Program; maintaining law and order throughout the 
country; and performing other functions as may be provided for by law.  It is charged 
with the duty of supervising the National Defense Program of the country.  It also has 
responsibility for overseeing field operations to ensure the judicious and effective 
implementation of National Defense and Security Programs (40). 
It exercises executive supervision over the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP), the Government Arsenal (GA), the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), the Philippine 
Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO), and the National Defense College of the Philippines 
(NDCP). 
The Undersecretary for National Defense (USND), the most senior undersecretary 
in the DND, is responsible for the implementation of the AFP modernization program, to 
include the related programs of modernization of the Government Arsenal and the SRDP 
(policy aspects only).  He is also responsible for the defense-security policy formulation 
(macro policies only), in coordination with the Undersecretary for Operations and 
Undersecretary for Civil Relations (USCR), to include the AFP 5-year development 




2. The Armed Forces of the Philippines 
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is responsible for upholding the 
sovereignty, supporting the Constitution, and defending the territory, of the Republic of 
the Philippines against all enemies, foreign and domestic; advancing the national aims, 
interests and policies; planning and organization; maintenance, development and 
deployment of its regular and citizen reserve forces for national security; likewise 
providing a stable and secure environment so that the programs of the government to 
build a stable, just and progressive society for the citizenry can be pursued unhampered.  
Its functions are the following: 
a. Secure and protect the country against all kinds of threats-external and 
internal. 
b. Enhance and pursue activities which shall truly project the image of the 
AFP as the protector of the people and partner of government in promoting national 
stability and development. 
c. Assist in the maintenance of peace and order and law enforcement 
activities. 
d. Pursue the Self-Reliant Defense Posture (SRDP) Program to reduce 
dependence on defense materials and technology from external sources and instead 
develop a viable defense industry in accordance with the country's economic capability.  
D. PERTINENT STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
The AFP receives the authority to obtain its weapons system and other equipment 
from Republic Act (RA) Number 7898, otherwise known as the AFP Modernization Act.  
This statute was signed into law on 23 February 1995.  This act empowers the AFP to 
modernize its forces to a degree where it can fully and effectively perform its 
constitutional mandate to defend the sovereignty, and to protect and preserve the 
patrimony, of the Republic of the Philippines.   
The Modernization Law also provides for the size and shape of the AFP in terms 
of personnel strength, equipment and facilities that the Defense establishment will have 
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to develop within a fifteen-year period.  Consequent to the AFP Modernization Act is the 
approval of the AFP Modernization Program by Congress through Joint Resolution (JR) 
Number 28 on 19 December 1996.  This resolution prescribes the size and shape of the 
AFP during the various phases of the modernization process.  It addresses the capability 
development of the AFP via the five component programs.   
The five programs are force restructuring and organizational development, 
material and technology development, base development, human resource development 
and doctrines development.  To sustain the Program, an initial outlay of PhP50-B for the 
first five years was to be appropriated through the AFP Modernization Act Trust Fund 
(AFPMATF). 
RA 7898 essentially requires the Defense establishment to: 
1. Give preference to Filipino contractors and suppliers or foreign 
contractors and suppliers willing and able to locate a substantial portion of production in 
the Philippines; 
2. Incorporate as much as possible, in each contract/agreement provisions for 
counter-trade, in-country manufacture, co-production schemes or other innovative 
agreements; and  
3. Include in the contract the transfer to the AFP the principal technology 
involved for the operation and maintenance of the equipment. 
The DND Circular No. 29, “Implementing Guidelines to RA 7898,” was issued 
on 19 May 1996.  DND Circular No. 1, “Implementing Guidelines, Rules, and 
Regulations (IGRR) of the AFP Modernization Program” superseded this.  The IGRR 
provides the details on the objectives of the statute as well as defines the policies for the 
implementation of the five components of the Modernization Program.  It also describes 
the acquisition process under the AFPMP. 
Other laws, rules, and regulations that impact on the AFP acquisition process are 
the following: 
1. Executive Order No. 40 (EO 40) issued on 08 October 2001, which 
consolidates the procurement rules and procedures for all national government agencies, 
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government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions and 
requires the use of the government electronic procurement system.  It provides for the 
preparation, maintenance and updating of a Procurement Management Plan and the 
establishment of a single Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) subject to certain 
exceptions including complexity and number of items to be procured.  Additionally, EO 
40 mandates all government agencies to use the Electronic Procurement System (EPS) in 
accordance with the policies, rules, regulations, and procedures adopted by the 
Procurement Policy Board (PPB); 
2. Executive Order No. 262 (EO 262) issued on 05 July 2000, which 
amended Executive Order No. 302 of 1996 and Executive Order 201 issued in 2000, 
provides the policies, guidelines, rules, and regulations for the procurement of goods and 
supplies by the national government.  EO 262 also provides guidelines for the creation of 
the Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) This EO governs 
procurement contracts under the capability, materiel and technology development 
component of the Program; 
3. Executive Order No. 109 (EO 109) issued in May 2002, which streamlines 
the rules and procedures in the review and approval of all contracts entered into by 
departments, bureaus, offices, and agencies of the government.  EO 109 authorizes the 
department secretary full authority to enter into all government contracts and to give final 
approval on contracts entered into by their respective departments, bureaus, offices and 
agencies.   
4. Executive Order No. 120 (EO 120) issued in 1993, and its implementing 
rules and regulations, which directs the national government, its departments, bureaus, 
agencies and offices, to include government-owned and controlled corporations, to adopt 
counter-trade as a trade tool for procurement contracts worth US One Million Dollars or 
more ($ 1.0 M).  In an interview with the Director of the Naval Modernization Office, 
Commander Zyril D. Carlos, the Secretary of National Defense (SND) has set the 
counter-trade requirement to 100%; 
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5. Department of Finance/Department of Budget/Commission on Audit Joint 
Circular Number 4-98, which provides rules and regulations for the proper handling and 
administration of the AFP Modernization Trust Fund (AFPMPTF). 
6. AFP Manual 4-2, AFP Procurement System issued in 1995, which 
principally provides for logistics support management but also describes the acquisition 
system, policies, and procedures for use in acquiring major systems consistent with RA 
7898 and the IGRR.   
7. AFP Manual 4-6, AFP Capital Equipment Acquisition Manual, which 
essentially institutionalizes the capital equipment acquisition process in the AFP.  It is 
intended to serve as a guide for the acquisition of major capital equipment in the AFP and 
discusses the equipment acquisition organization, the code of ethics, the acquisition 
process, risk management, and the self-reliant defense program.  This manual includes a 
project management acquisition plan, which will be discussed later in this study. 
8. AFP Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) Number 6, 7, 8, and 9 all 
issued on 30 August 2000.  SOP No. 6 provides for the creation of the AFP 
Modernization Board and prescribes its functions, composition, duties and 
responsibilities of its members, governing policies and procedures of the AFP 
Modernization Board.  SOP No. 7 defines the functions, organization, duties and 
responsibilities of Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) members, 
policies and procedures regarding the BAC.  SOP No. 8 prescribes the functions, 
composition, duties and responsibilities of members, policies and procedures of the 
Project Management Teams (PMTs).  SOP No. 9 provides for the policies and procedures 
in the procurement of equipment and weapons systems under the AFP Modernization 
Program. 
9. AFP Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) Number 2 issued in February 
1997, which provides for the creation of the Bids, Awards, and Negotiations Committee, 
amended to the Bids and Awards Committee (BANC), and prescribes their composition, 
functions, and responsibilities.  The BANC is assigned one modernization project.  It is 
tasked to evaluate and select a contractor and subsequently prepare the contract for that 
project.  The BAC is dissolved following the approval and signing of the contract. 
12 
10. Philippine Navy (PN) Circular Number 2 series of 1993 or the PN Ship 
Acquisition Project Management System (SAPMS) established the SAPMS for effective 
implementation of the PN Fleet Modernization Program even before the AFP 
Modernization Act was passed.  It prescribed policies and procedures for the SAPMS and 
prescribed the functions, composition, duties, and responsibilities of the Ship Acquisition 
Project Management Team (SAPMT).  While still applicable, this circular has been 
superseded by other issuances from higher headquarters. 
The AFP Modernization Act and the other issuances, guidelines, rules, and 
regulations pertaining thereto are detailed with regards to procurement procedures for the 
AFPMP is concerned, but are less explicit regarding the conduct of acquisition planning.  
What is provided is merely a format of the Project Management Acquisition Plan.  
Neither are these laws and issuances clear on what training or education is required and 
how to provide the necessary training and education for personnel who are to conduct 
acquisition planning for the AFP.  Of significant importance to the success of equipment 
and weapon systems acquisitions for the AFPMP is a workforce that has the adequate 
training and education to do program management and contract negotiations.  Acquisition 
planning is an integral part of this process, however, as mentioned earlier, what the AFP 
has is just a format and no guide to accomplish it.  There is even no mention of who is 
responsible for the acquisition plan although one can surmise that it is the program 
manager who is responsible for this. 
The AFP has very few officers who have the education and training to do 
acquisition planning.  While the AFP doesn’t have a lack for strategic planners, it does 
lack acquisition planners.  The AFP has two qualified contracting officers who just 
graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School but has no qualified program manager 
who has the education and experience for acquisition planning.    
The basis for acquisition planning for the AFP Modernization Program is the 
IGRR.  The IGRR mandates the Major Services with the responsibility of planning for 
the procurement of an equipment or weapons system without the attendant responsibility 
for contract negotiation.  However, the IGRR does not provide for more logical and 
specific guidelines for acquisition planning except to say that the Project Management 
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Teams (PMTs) of the Major Services are responsible from identification up to 
implementation of a single procurement project.  While it is true that the PMTs are 
responsible for the formulation of the CORs and the BEPs, it is not quite clear as to how 
these are going to be conducted and what standards are to be followed in the planning 
process.  The IGRR is much too vague for the Major Services to be able to provide a 
more realistic and responsive acquisition plan for the AFP Modernization Program.   
AFP Manual 4-2 provides that the program manager concerned, among all other 
duties, shall develop an acquisition strategy tailored to the acquisition program but does 
not say how the strategy is to be developed.  The acquisition strategy provides the basis 
for the acquisition plan but this is not included in the manual.  This manual does provide 
policies and issues that should be considered in acquisition planning such as promoting 
and sustaining competition, integrated logistics support, life-cycle costing, source 
selection and evaluation procedures, contract award and administration, among others.  
However, these are not presented in a coherent and structured manner like in an 
acquisition plan. 
AFP Manual 4-6 provides for the organization of PMTs in accordance with the 
IGRR.  Its other responsibilities are to monitor and review records of proceedings of all 
committees/agencies working on the project, implement the contract, monitor progress of 
the project after turn-over to the user, and turn-over the project to concerned staff when 
appropriate.  The emphasis of this manual is once again on the acquisition process 
although it provides more policies than AFP Manual 4-2 in that it incorporates project 
risk management in the aspects of cost, schedule, and performance in relative detail.  
Once again, there is no mention of how acquisition planning is to be done and who will 
be responsible for it.  This manual only has a project management acquisition plan format 
as an annex without the necessary guidelines on how to accomplish it, somewhat like an 
afterthought.   
Indeed, there is no acquisition planning guideline for AFPMP acquisitions. 
E. THE AFP ACQUISITION PROCESS AND PLANNING 
Before the abrogation of the US Bases Treaty in 1991 and the passage of the AFP 
Modernization Act, acquisition was not a major defense activity.  Weapon systems were 
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normally provided through FMS as part of US military aid to the Philippine Government.  
Requirements generation had a very simple structure whereby the major service 
determine its own requirement through its weapons board.  The major service weapons 
board submits the requirement to the major service commander for endorsement to GHQ.   
It is then reviewed by the AFP Weapons Board and submitted to the Chief of Staff AFP 
(CSAFP) for his subsequent approval.  The approved requirement is then forwarded to 
the SND for approval prior to its acquisition.  The requirements are then provided by the 
US through its Foreign Military Sales program and the major service usually gets what 
the US decides best addresses the military need.  There were no appropriate laws, rules or 
regulations that could guide acquisition for major defense projects mainly because the 
Philippine defense establishment never really embarked on such activities. 
There was no acquisition organization for major acquisition programs and this is 
the situation that exists today even with the passage of the AFP Modernization Act.  The 
acquisition process for the capability development programs of the AFPMP had 
undergone changes for the better and continues to be streamlined, however.  
Nevertheless, the numerous statutes and policies of the government have hampered the 
implementation of the program along with the resource constraints associated with the 
economic problems besetting the government. 
The AFPMP acquisition and contracting is conducted in two stages: the 
equipment acquisition stage (project definition and validation); and the contract 
negotiation stage.  The following activities are conducted during project identification 
and validation: 
1.   Major Services organize their respective Project Management Teams (PMTs), 
each of which will be responsible for a single procurement project in all its stages from 
identification up to implementation, except the Contract Negotiation stage.  PMTs are 
normally composed of a minimum of three officers headed by the project manager.  They 
are responsible for the formulation of the Circulars of Requirements (CORs), which 
define the operational and technical requirements of the Major Services, and the Bid 
Evaluation Plan (BEP), which includes the procedure for the acquisition of an equipment 
or weapons system indicating the method of procurement, the conduct of pre-
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qualification of bidders, the bidding proper up to and including the award of the contract.  
The Major Service Modernization Board reviews and validates the CORs and BEP and 
the Major Service Commander endorses it to the AFP Modernization Board; and, 
2.   The AFP Modernization Board together with the AFP-DND Technical 
Working Group reviews and validates the CORs and BEPs (Figure 2-1).  The record of 
its proceedings will then be appended to its recommendations to the Chief of Staff, AFP 
and shall contain all the deliberations between the AFP Modernization Board, AFP-DND 
Technical Working Group, and the Major Service Modernization Board concerned.  
CORs and BEPs shall be submitted to the Secretary of National Defense for approval but 
will be subjected to a review by the DND Review Board before the SND issues the 
Procurement Directive (Figure 2-2). 
 
Figure 2-1 AFP Equipment Process 




 Figure 2-2 AFP Equipment Process 
(From BAC/PMT Preparatory Training Slide) 
 
The second stage, contract negotiation, starts at the General Headquarters of the 
AFP and following are the activities: 
3. Upon receipt of the Procurement Directive from the SND, the CSAFP then 
creates the Bids And Awards Committee which is responsible for the determination of 
eligibility, evaluation of bids, conduct of the bidding, post-qualification of the most 
advantageous bid (MAB) and recommendation for the award of contract.  Figure 2-3 
shows the BAC bidding process.  At this point, the Joint Counter trade Working Group 
(JCWG) evaluates the technical and financial aspects of the bid and economic packages 
associated with it and submits its evaluations to the BAC.  The CSAFP then endorses to 
the SND the MAB for approval; 
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 Figure 2-3 BAC Bidding Process for the AFP Modernization Program 
(From BAC/PMT Preparatory Training Slide) 
 
4. The SND approves the MAB and issues the Notice of Award; 
5. The BAC then prepares and finalizes the contract with the assistance of 
the AFPMP Modernization Office and thereafter the CSAFP reviews and endorses the 
contract to the SND.  Upon signing of the contract with the winning bidder, the SND 
shall issue the Notice to Proceed.  Copies of the approved contract are forwarded to 
Congress in case it is multi-year to enable Congress to appropriate funds for the contract 
pursuant to Section (b) and (c) of Republic Act 7898.  If it is a negotiated contract that 
exceeds 300 million pesos, the National Economic and Development Authority Reviews 





Figure 2-4 AFP Equipment Process 
(From BAC/PMT Preparatory Training Slide) 
6. The PMT then takes over to implement the contract. 
Acquisition planning for the AFPMP is built-in in the acquisition and contract 
process, but as had been mentioned earlier, there are neither structures nor standards set 
for the Major Services as to how to accomplish an acquisition plan.  There are neither 
regulations nor guidelines for acquisition planning and the Major Services are left to their 
own ideas about how to go about making planning an acquisition.  What the Philippine 
defense establishment has are elements of an acquisition plan but not a comprehensive 
acquisition plan that incorporates all the elements thereto as done in the US defense 
establishment. 
In the thesis of Commander Caesar C. Taccad (27: p. 45), his interview with 
Captain Emilio C. Marayag revealed that the AFP has not experienced these kinds of 
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acquisitions where it is spending Philippine funds and not money coming from foreign 
assistance.  Before, AFP acquisitions mostly came from Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
funds from the US.  This inexperience in major acquisitions such as those for the AFPMP 
underscores the importance of having an acquisition plan to establish a logical and 
systematic approach for meeting a government need.  Commander Taccad further found 
that there is no single regulation that provides a complete and definitive guidance for the 
major system acquisitions required in the AFPMP.  It is still the case at this time although 
improvements have been made, like the streamlining of the equipment acquisition 
process that have reduced the time it takes to conduct an acquisition to about 44 weeks. 
In Commander Jaime J. Montanez’ thesis, he established the need for qualified 
contracting officers in the AFP for its modernization program (28: pp. 57-60).  In the 
Philippine setting, however, these have long been the purview of private entities while 
the AFP does not to have a structure that provides for contracting officers nor for the 
practice of negotiations.  This leaves the AFP officials who are to conduct contract 
administration and negotiations at a very big disadvantage and this could translate to 
higher contract costs than desired.  Given the scarce resources that the AFP has for its 
program, cost is and should be a prime consideration.  Thus, he recommends the 
establishment of contracting officer positions and formalized education and training 
programs within the AFP to address the skill requirements in contracting.  Contracting 
and negotiations are integral to acquisition planning but the absence of contracting officer 
positions in the AFPMP deprives the Program of needed expertise in the conduct of 
acquisition planning. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 This chapter presented a background about the Philippines, its history, political 
system, people, economy, and religion among others.  More importantly, the literature 
review revealed that while the equipment acquisition process itself is clear, there is no 
clear structure for planning the acquisition.  In the pertinent statutes, rules, and 
regulations cited in this chapter, acquisition planning was never given the emphasis it 
deserves.  The only regulation that even mentions an acquisition plan is the AFP Manual 
4-6 but seemingly as an afterthought because there was no mention in the text of the 
manual except as a format in its attachment. 
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Given the complexity of acquisition and the fact that the AFP has very little 
experience in actual acquisitions of this magnitude, acquisition planning is crucial to 
success.  As mentioned earlier, the AFP had for so long depended on FMS sales for its 
acquisitions and this is the first opportunity in a very long time to do acquisitions on its 
own using Philippine funds.  With very scarce resources, careful and meticulous planning 
is a must. 
The next chapter will present the results of the literature review of the acquisition 
process in the US and other countries, notably United Kingdom and Germany, and 
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III. ACQUISITION SYSTEM IN THE US DOD AND OTHER 
COUNTRIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results of the literature review on the acquisition system 
and processes in the US’ and two other countries’ defense establishment, namely 
Germany and United Kingdom.  It describes each country’s acquisition system, 
organization, and process and takes a glimpse of the defense/military acquisition 
characteristics of the three countries that can provide an insight into the practices and 
approaches of each nation.  It is not intended to be an analysis of which is the best 
system.  It then describes acquisition planning as practiced in the US defense 
establishment.  The objective of this chapter is to provide a broader understanding of the 
acquisition process and the importance of having an acquisition plan in the success of a 
program. 
B. THE GERMAN ACQUISITION SYSTEM 
1. The Federal Ministry of Defense (26: p. 2-10 to 2-12) 
The Minister of Defense, who heads the Federal Ministry of Defense, is 
responsible for commanding the German Armed Forces in times of peace.  Two 
Parliamentary State Secretaries from the Bundestag, the lower house of the federal 
parliament, support him in running the Ministry.  The two Parliamentary State Secretaries 
are concerned with the relations and communications with the Parliament.  Two State 
Secretaries from the civil service also support him.  Their primary roles are to provide 
authority, expertise, leadership, and continuity in running the ministry.   
The Federal Ministry of Defense (FMOD) consists of two elements-the civilian 
Federal Administrative portion, and the military or armed forces (Bundeswehr).  The 
civilian Federal Administrative division is the responsibility of the State Secretary for 
Administration and includes personnel, budgets, administrative and legal affairs, 
infrastructure, social services, including oversight of the Federal Academy of Defense 
Administration and Technology.  The Federal Academy provides armament acquisition 
and management education to the workforce, especially the civilian part of the FMOD.  
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The State Secretary for Armament and Logistics has responsibility for security and 
alliance policy, arms control, intelligence and other areas.  He is also responsible for 
armament matters and the Director General of Armaments reports to him. 
 
Figure 3-1 Organization of the German Federal Ministry of Defense 
   
2. The Bundeswehr 
The Bundeswehr, the military portion of the Ministry of Defense was established 
in 1955 pursuant to the 1949 German Constitution.  The senior military leader is the 
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, supported by a deputy Chief of Staff.  He is the 
senior military advisor to the Minister of Defense and the Chancellor and a non-voting 
member of the Cabinet’s Federal Security Council.  He chairs the Federal Armed Forces 
Defense Council, which consists of the Deputy and the Chiefs of the three services.  The 
Army, Navy, Air Force and the Surgeon General make up the rest of the Bundeswehr.   
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3. The Requirements Process 
The military services are organized in the same way with each having a central 
staff, a C2 Command for operational planning and mission control, a support command 
and an office for central issues, which has the function of a Training, Development, and 
Doctrine Command or TRADOC.  The military service staffs determine military 
equipment requirements, provide logistics support, perform operational tests on new 
equipment, and maintain the weapons systems.  They are involved throughout the 
acquisition process. 
This process operates similarly in each service.  The German Army develops their 
requirements through their troop schools and then presents them to TRADOC.  In the 
other services, it is the user or operating commands that develop their requirements and 
then present them to the support commands.  Then, the TRADOC and the support 
commands take over by way of their respective “study groups,” now called the “Standing 
Joint Study Group,” to check the requirement against the concepts and planning 
directives of the various staffs and commands and also to validate the military need.  The 
study groups then develop the “Staff Requirement,” which describes the equipment 
shortage and the military requirements. 
 The service staffs work with the Directorate General of Armaments (DGA) in the 
selection of possible solutions, much like in the Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) done in 
the US military, and participate in the research and technology concept efforts as users. 
4. The German Defense Acquisition System 
The DGA is the senior defense official responsible for research and development 
of new technologies and planning, supervision, and control of all Bundeswehr 
procurement programs (26: p. 2-15).  He is assisted by the Director of Armaments 
Management, a Director of Defense Technology, and eight staff offices, which have 
responsibility for oversight, planning and control of their respective functional areas. 
There are three divisions engaged in general tasks: (1) The Armaments Planning 
and Control Office; (2) The Armaments-Related Economic and Legal Affairs Division; 
and (3) The International Armament Affairs Office.  The Armaments Planning and 
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Control Office is responsible for the administrative control of personnel, budget and 
finance, funds management, and the Federal Office of Military Technology and 
Procurement, also known as the BWB.  The BWB is the acquisition organization of the 
defense ministry.  The Economic and Legal Affairs Office is responsible for economics 
to include industrial base issues, legal issues to include copyrights, patents, and contracts.  
It is also responsible for the disposal of military equipment.  The International 
Armaments Affairs Office is responsible for policies with NATO, Western European 
Union and other European countries with respect to armaments cooperation, military aid 
and military supply to international organizations.  
The other five offices are focused along technical areas with three dedicated on 
Service needs but oversight is still managed by the BWB.  With the technological 
revolution impacting on military operations, particularly regarding command, control, 
communications and interoperability, oversight and planning in this area has been given 
new emphasis with the Equipment and Technology, Intelligence, Command and Control, 
Communication, and Information Technology Office taking the lead role. 
2. The BWB 
The BWB, which was created to provide an interface between the Bundeswehr 
and industry, is under the control of the FMOD, but is not a military organization but a 
civilian one that operates independently.  Over the years, its role has evolved and it is 
now responsible for the project management of the weapons systems programs.  It is also 
responsible for the definition, development, engineering, test and evaluation, production 
and procurement of military weapon systems. 
The President heads the BWB assisted by two Vice-Presidents, one for 
technology and one for Economy.  It has three administrative divisions: (1) the Central 
Administrative (ZA) Division which is responsible for human resources, budget, payment 
of invoices and general administrative issues; (2) the Central Economic Affairs (AW) 
Division which is responsible for audits, pricing policy, cost audits and policy issues 
relating to the economy; and (3) the Center for Technology Affairs (AT) which is 
responsible for the scientific collection of information, international cooperation, 
government quality assurance, environmental occupation, safety human engineering and 
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technology related issues.  Central Controlling is responsible for internal cost control and 
oversight and inspection of the acquisition system. 
The seven technical divisions are responsible for the management of the weapon 
systems programs and are organized according to the type of equipment as in missiles, 
ships, aircraft or others.  These offices are responsible for systems engineering, 
integration, research and technology, and in-service and post-design services.  Through 
their respective contracts divisions, they also award the development or procurement 
contracts to industry.  The armament project managers reside in these divisions and 
perform important roles in reviewing requirements.  They are vested with the authority to 
revise or eliminate requirements for cost or schedule reasons.  Figure 3-2 is a depiction of 
the BWB’s organization. 
 




3. The FMOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) 
The overarching document for planning is the Defense Policy Guidelines, which 
describes the present and future political, economic, and military conditions, to include 
risks and threats.  It lays out the armed forces planning for a period of five years in the 
mid-term, and long-term (fifteen years).  This document then describes the defense policy 
and structure necessary to address these issues with the goal of providing defense 
planners with stable financial and structural strategic assumptions.  The Guidelines are 
prepared by the Planning Staff of the Federal Ministry of Defense and endorsed by the 
Minister himself. 
The Military Strategic Objectives derived from the Guidelines provide the 
structure for the development of concepts, mission definitions, and a set of goals 
necessary to accomplish them (26: p. 2-19).  The Bundeswehr Concept then prioritizes 
the tasks necessary to accomplish the military strategic concepts and the design of the 
forces needed to meet mission needs.  The next document is the Planning Guideline that 
translates the threat-oriented statements of need into definable requirements.  The 
Bundeswehr Plan is the final document, which provides the military needs to include 
military equipment and weapon systems.  It is in this document that a project must be 
scheduled to become a part of the annual program as a basis for the annual budget 
estimate. 
The Bundeswehr Plan prepared by the FMOD initiates the budget process with 
the Federal Ministry of Finance providing the budget guidelines after its submission.  
Then, the Armaments Directorate and Services develop the budget needs and prepare a 
consolidated budget for military systems and equipment.  The FMOD Budget Directorate 
subsequently submits the draft budget to the cabinet.  The Finance Ministry reviews the 
Draft Defense budget and after coordinating with and obtaining approval of the budget 
from the Cabinet, the budget is submitted to Parliament for its own review process.  The 
FMOD portion of the budget process takes about eight months but is relatively stable 
with few changes happening in the budget of weapon system programs once the 
government has made its commitment to the program.  Figure 3-3 shows the budget flow. 
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Figure 3-3 Federal Ministry of Defense – Typical Flow of Budget 
 
4. The FMOD Acquisition Management Process (26: pp. 2-21 to 2-24) 
The document that governs program development is the “Directive for the 
Planning, Development, Procurement, and Acceptance of Defense Materiel and Data 
Processing Projects” (EBMat).  The process has five phases starting from the Pre-
Definition phase and continuing through the In-Service phase.  A decision and approval 
is required at the end of each phase to determine as to whether or how, the program is to 
be continued.  The purpose of this is to reduce program risks. 
 a. Pre-Definition Phase 
 It is at this stage that the military need is validated or verified by the 
Services.  The Tactical Concept describes the equipment shortage and the military 
requirement.  Market research and evaluation is performed by the FMOD/BWB with the 
participation of the military and industry.  Alternatives, including foreign ones, are 
considered.  Increased emphasis is placed on the affordability of systems and equipment 
and for streamlining the process. 
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A list of prioritized alternatives is given and once these are defined and 
their economic impacts estimated, the Staff Requirement (Tactical/Technical 
Requirement – TTF) is prepared.  This phase is concluded with a proposal or selection of 
a tactical-technical solution. 
 b. Definition Phase 
  In this phase, the project management responsibility is given to the BWB, 
which will complete the final specifications.  The Industry is usually involved at this 
point but care is taken to preclude any prejudgment on a subsequent competitive contract 
award.  The project manager and the team working groups are established during this 
phase including all those responsible for technical-engineering issues at the BWB.  A 
project officer from the military service support command is also assigned to represent 
service branch priorities within the project managers’ working groups.  Joint decision-
making and coordination is resorted to between the service branch and the BWB. 
  The Definition phase ends with the completion and approval of the 
“Development Baseline.” 
c. The Development Phase 
The Development phase includes the selection of the prime contractor 
where the development contract defines the contractor’s responsibilities, including the 
generation of materiel baselines, service and logistics capability.  Initial operational 
capability and logistics supportability trials are performed during this phase.  The BWB 
conducts the development efforts but the Armed Services are responsible for certifying to 
the systems logistics supportability and for the successful completion of operational 
testing and “Approval for Service Use”.  This phase ends with the approval of the 
“Approval for Production” document. 
d. Procurement Phase 
The procurement phase includes all activities necessary to execute 
production, including the selection of the contractor for the procurement phase.  It 
concludes with the delivery of the production equipment to the military and the 
preparation of the Final Report by the BWB. 
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e. In-Service Phase 
The delivery of the first equipment signals the beginning of the In-Service 
Phase.  The user takes responsibility for the equipment, and an in-service manager is 
assigned who is responsible for ensuring the operational capability of the system or 
equipment.  Since the service schools are normally the first to receive production 
equipment, the Services prepare for initial operational capability by setting up at the 
service schools systems/equipment specific training, maintenance and field operations, 
and core units of school personnel for the training of field user units’ personnel. 
The process of systems/equipment documentation to integrate the new 
system/equipment into the services’ inventory is performed by the support and logistics 
commands.  The BWB however continues to provide engineering and logistical support 
and will buy the spare parts, issue repair contracts and develop and incorporate changes 
for deficiencies and operational improvements.  Significant changes could be enough to 
start the process once again. 
f. Designation of Programs 
There are three program categories for systems/equipment.  Category 1, 
which is a major program and requires approval from the Bundestag or Parliament, 
includes systems with a value larger than 20 Million deutsche marks (DM) in 
development and greater than 50M DM in production.  Category 2 programs (from 2-
20M DM for development and 5-50M DM for production) receive approval with the 
Armed Service Command within the military services.  Category 3 programs which have 
monetary values below the Category 2 thresholds. 
C. THE UNITED KINGDOM (UK) DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM 
1. The Defense Organization of the UK 
The central machinery for managing United Kingdom’s Armed Services is 
through the Ministry of Defense (MOD.  Policy-making is concentrated in its 
headquarters with military and civilian staffs work in integrated hierarchies.  The Defense 
Council under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State for Defense is vested with a 
range of powers under government statute to conduct Defense in the UK.  Under the 
Defense Council are the Service Boards, the Admiralty, Army and Air Force Boards, 
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which exercise a range of formal and statutory powers to administer their respective 
service and personnel. 
The Secretary of State for Defense is responsible for the formulation and conduct 
of defense policy, as well as providing the means by which it is conducted.  Two 
Ministers of State assist him, one for the Armed Forces, which deals with operational and 
policy issues, and one for Defense Procurement.  There’s also a Parliamentary 
Undersecretary (PUS) who assists him with personnel issues and estate business among 
other matters (26: p. 3-7). 
The Secretary of State and his three Ministerial colleagues head the Ministry of 
Defense and are accountable to Parliament for all Defense matters.  Parliament exercises 
oversight through debates, departmental Select Committees, questions, both oral and 
written, and inquiries from individual Members of Parliament (MP).  Parliament also 
holds the Department to account for public money through the House of Commons 
Public Accounts Committee. 
The aim of the MOD is to define the strategy and maximize the defense 
capability, within the allocated resources, required to (26: p. 3-8): 
• Deter any threat to, and if necessary defend, the freedom and integrity of 
the UK and its dependent territories, including the provision of support as necessary for 
the civil authority in countering terrorism. 
• Contribute to the promotion of the UK’s wider security interests, including 
the protection and enhancement of freedom and democratic institutions, and the 
promotion of free trade; and 
• Promote peace and to help maximize the UK’s international prestige and 
influence. 
The MOD structure is shown in Figure 3-4, which shows the Secretary of State 
with two principal advisers: the Chief of Defense Staff or CDS for the military, and one 
civilian, the Permanent Under Secretary of State or PUS.  They share responsibility for 
most of the Department’s business and are neither subordinate nor superior to the other. 
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Figure 3-4 MOD Top Level Organization 
 
The CDS is the head of the Armed Forces in the UK and is selected from any 
Service.  He is the primary military adviser to the Secretary of State and the Government.  
The PUS is the primary civilian adviser on Defense and is mainly responsible for policy, 
finance, and administration of the Department.   He coordinates the provision of advice to 
Ministers and is also the MOD’s Principal Accounting Officer, which makes him 
accountable to Parliament for the expenditure of all public money voted for Defense 
purposes. 
The CDS and PUS have their own deputies, the Vice-Chief of Defense Staff 
(VCDS) and the 2nd PUS respectively.  The two deputies jointly head the Central Staff, 
the heart of the Ministry of Defense.  Below the CDS are the three Service Chiefs of 
Staff: the Chief of Naval Staff, the Chief of General Staff and the Chief of Air Staff.  
They are responsible for their respective Service’s overall fighting effectiveness, 
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efficiency and morale in order to deliver the military capability in accordance with 
Defense policy needs. 
The Chief of Defense Procurement (CDP) heads the Defense Procurement 
Agency (DPA) and is its Chief Executive.  He is responsible for the development and 
acquisition of weapons systems.   The DPA is the largest procurement organization in 
government. 
The Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA) helps ensure that scientific and technological 
considerations are given full weight in decision-making and has significant influence 
over research work primarily being undertaken by the government-owned Defense 
Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA).  Customarily, he is a distinguished scientist or 
engineer brought into the civil service on a fixed-term appointment (about five years). 
The positions previously described compose the Defense Council.  The non-
Ministerial members of the Council compose the Finance, Planning and Management 
Group (FPMG).  The FPMG acts as the Department’s corporate board and is responsible 
for directing a number of key processes, particularly the annual re-costing of the Defense 
programs and the planning process.  The PUS normally chairs the FPMG. 
2. The Requirements Generation Process 
The Central Staff is organized into several areas but the one most concerned for 
acquisition is the Systems Area under the Deputy Chief of the Defense Staff (Systems).  
It is responsible for identifying the necessary equipment capabilities for the Armed 
Forces, and for formulating the Operational Requirements or specifications for the 
military equipment.  It manages the Applied Research Program as well. 
The Operational Requirements (OR) branches in the System Area are responsible 
for defining capability gaps within their defined area and describe these capability gaps in 
User Requirement Documents (URD) that state the function and desired performance of 
the capability in general terms.  The URD shall have the benefit of the results of 
feasibility studies, usually involving both the DERA and industry.  The URD is the 
official statement of the requirements to fill the capability gap. 
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The OR branches work quite closely with counterparts in other areas in the 
Central Staff and those outside it.  Those who make significant contributions to the 
process are the Services who will operate and maintain the equipment, the DPA’s 
technical and project management experts, DERA and industry. 
Chaired by the Chief Scientific Adviser, the Equipment Approvals Committee 
(EAC) is the one ultimately responsible for the requirement and makes the necessary 
recommendations to Ministers on the largest projects (defined as in excess of £400M 
total procurement cost).  It authorizes others within its delegated powers for projects 
falling between £100M-£400M.  Below the £100M threshold, the EAC delegates 
responsibility to two and one-star officers. 
The scrutiny, whether done by EAC or delegated by them, is a careful comparison 
of the relative cost and operational effectiveness of alternative solutions to the 
requirement.  Systems are assessed against a wide variety of scenarios and scrutiny is 
made of the life-cycle cost of operating a system.  This means reliability and 
maintainability factors are given significant consideration along with the manpower to 
sustain and support the system.  This process is termed as the Combined Operational 
Effectiveness and Investment Appraisal (COEIA) (26: p. 3-17). 
Additionally, other issues are examined including the appropriate procurement 
strategy, whether to develop a new system in collaboration with other countries or 
developing it domestically, buying commercial off-the-shelf items, analysis of risks for 
each option, among others issues.  Only after the EAC or its delegated authority are 
convinced of the answers to its many questions will it decide to allow a project to proceed 
to the next stage. 
3. The Defense Procurement Agency (DPA) 
The DPA buys over £5 billion of new systems, equipment and initial logistics 
support for the Armed Forces and manages more than 13,000 contracts with 
approximately 5,500 personnel.  Acquisitions range from purchases of submarines to 
small spare parts for a field radio. 
The Minister of State for Defense Procurement oversees the procurement of 
Defense equipment but it is the responsibility of the DPA.  Led by the Chief of Defense 
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Procurement or CDP, the DPA is accountable to Parliament for the spending of the funds 
that has been allocated for equipment procurement and logistic support.  The CDP has 
two deputies, the Deputy Chief Executive (DCE) and a Deputy Chief of Defense 
Procurement (Operations) (DCDP [Ops]) (26: p. 3-18).  There is an Executive Board 
consisting of six Executive Directors and the DCE.  Each of the Executive Directors is 
responsible for managing the procurement of different systems or types of Defense 
equipment and is assisted by ten Support Directors who manage grouping of similar types 
and ranges of equipment.  They are grouped into 11 Peer Groups where similar types and 
systems are grouped regardless of land, sea and air specialization.  Within each of these 
Peer Groups, management of the procurement project is vested in the Project Managers 
who lead integrated management teams incorporating technical, contracts, finance, 
quality control and logistic support expertise.  Figure 3- 5 shows the DPA organization. 
The aim of the UK Defense procurement is to buy equipment for the Armed 
Forces that meet their requirements and timescales with the best value for money.  With 
the MOD spending around £12 billion on goods and services annually, competition is 
fundamental to getting value for money and is used whenever possible.  The entire life 
cycle of the equipment is considered since support costs can exceed the cost of the 
procurement over its useful service life.  Foreign contractors are free to bid for the 
majority of MOD business as prime or sub-contractors and offsetting some of the value 
of the contract is resorted to and can be a deciding factor in competition for a contract.  
Collaborative ventures with other countries are also resorted to because Defense 
equipment has become increasingly complex and expensive but only as an approach to 
obtaining the best value. 
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Figure 3-5 The Organization of the DPA 
 
4. The MOD Defense Acquisition Cycle 
37 
The Defense cycle of the MOD had been changed over the years in order to 
streamline and make acquisitions more responsive to the needs of its war fighters.  
However, procurement of major equipment continued to experience budget and schedule 
overruns even though risk was reduced significantly.  By 1998, a Strategic Defense 
Review (SDR) was instituted by the government to review MOD procurements and 
sought proposals on how to do them faster, cheaper and better.  Known as the Smart 
Procurement Initiative (SPI), the review fundamentally changed the structure, the 
process, and the procedures in the acquisition organization.  It introduced a modified 
acquisition cycle aimed at improving risk evaluation and reducing the interruptions to 
project workflow.  It is expected to be a more robust answer to the challenges of Defense 
acquisitions in the face of less predictable threats and tasks, increasing complex and 
diverse Defense equipment, a rapidly changing industrial structure, and new Treasury 
performance targets for time and cost of Defense procurement (26: p. 3-22). 
 
Figure 3-6 The Ministry of Defense Procurement Phases 
 
The current acquisition cycle reduces the number of formal approval points and 
reduces the number of phases.  But the primary change was the establishment of 
Integrated Project Teams (IPTs), which were responsible and accountable for the 
acquisition.  The IPT focuses on the customer and the goals of their activities are to 
achieve a smooth flow of responsibility from the start to the finish of the acquisition 
process. 
The central theme of the government’s approach to procurement of Defense 
equipment is value for money, hence, competition continues to be the MOD’s main tool 
in achieving this procurement goal.   
The phases of the acquisition cycle are concept, assessment, demonstration, 
manufacture and in-service.  Key features of the cycle include the Initial Gate, Main Gate                              




The goal of the concept phase is to identify which options for a given 
mission should be developed further; eliminating the options not worthy of further 
investigation.  A survey and demonstration of technologies is taken from the Applied 
Research Programme (ARP) together with high level Operational Analysis. 
The options to meet a capability gap are carried out by the Capability 
Working Groups (CWGs) formed by the Capability Manager to oversee the definition of 
the requirement by applying the principles of Systems Engineering.  An inceptive IPT is 
formed to make preliminary through-life cost estimates to go with the draft User 
Requirement Document (URD) with a shortlist of viable options.  The shortlist of options 
is then presented as the case for the formal Initial Gate Approval. 
b. Initial Gate 
The Initial Gate marks the approval by the Equipment Approvals 
Committee of the resources needed for Assessment.  The EAC recognizes that the 
considerable expenditure requires formal approval of a mission need and the funds to be 
spent.  The preliminary through-life cost estimates are also noted by the EAC as 
reasonable for the proposed capability subject to validation during Assessment. 
c. Assessment 
The goal of the assessment phase is to select a single technological option 
for demonstration, with technical risk from sub-systems reduced to acceptable levels.  
This is done after the completion of comparative operational analysis of the alternative 
options.   
Indicative procurement and life cycle costs shall have been set during the 
assessment phase.  Operational performance trade-offs are undertaken iteratively to 
determine the optimal balance between whole-life costs, performance and time.  At the 
end of this phase, the goal is to identify the best value for money solution and establish 
firm costs for the acquisition as well as its ownership throughout its entire life. 
The Performance Requirement needed for the approval submission 
consists of: 
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• Systems Requirement Document (SRD); 
• Key Performance Parameters; and 
• Tradable Requirements 
All of these requirements are linked to mission needs but only the Key 
Performance Parameters are absolute while all the others are tradable during the 
Demonstration Phase.  Specific output requirements are also identified but the 
implementation and technical details are not.  Other documents included in the approval 
submission prior to the demonstration phase are cost and time boundaries, the 
procurement and through-life support strategy, and a plan for managing the remaining 
risk, which are all material sub-sets of the Through-Life Management Plan (TLMP).  
About 15 percent of project costs may be spent up to the end of the 
assessment phase, which normally allows for an iterative risk reduction if necessary.  A 
key change to previous practice is that, rather than going to Full Development to meet a 
pre-determined in-Service Date (ISD), the IPT is encouraged to focus on activities that 
will reduce project risks and will be key to reaching a position where both the MOD and 
the selected contractor(s) are satisfied that they have a solid basis to proceed with the 
project (26: p. 3-25). 
d. Main Gate 
This is the major review point, established at the end of the Assessment 
Phase, which determines commitment to a project.  It is at this point in which the IPT and 
the customer jointly submit to the approving authorities recommendations on whether the 
project should continue to the Demonstration and Manufacture phases.  Additionally, 
they present recommendations as to the firm parameters that need to be established for 
the project going forward.  This means a firm Equipment Programme funding line, a firm 
total cost for any infrastructure, assets and associated equipment whole-life costs, a firm 
ISD, and a finalized performance-based requirement.  Any project that does not provide 
an acceptable balance between performance, whole-life costs and time should be 
cancelled (26: p. 3-26). 
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After granting Main Gate approval, further reference to the approving 
authorities after the Demonstration phase are needed only in exceptional cases: 
• the project exceeds agreed performance, cost and schedule 
thresholds; and 
• wider affordability or other issues have arisen that could change or 
undermine the original decision. 
e. Demonstration 
This phase involves the selection of a single contractor for the remaining 
development and production of the equipment.  Technical risk shall have been reduced to 
a degree that the contractor will be willing to assume it and the project manager is willing 
to transfer the same.  Performance trade-offs continue to be undertaken during the 
Demonstration phase to refine and finalize the solution, and to establish a firm capitalized 
asset value and best estimates to support costs.  Design to cost principles are normally 
employed, which is a significant change to the previous practice of using requirements 
management to maximize performance at a fixed cost.  Development is started during this 
phase and operational trials in the field or synthetic environments could be undertaken. 
f. Manufacture 
This phase starts the production run of the equipment after completion of 
full development.  The manufacturer and the user continue to have equipment trials 
against acceptance criteria.  When the customer accepts the equipment, the in-service 
phase commences and the Capability Manager’s role as the customer for the equipment 
ceases. 
g. In-Service Date 
This is the date on which the capability becomes available to the specific 
Commander-in-Chief (CinC) and considered to be the most significant milestone in the 
equipment’s existence.  At this stage, effective support of the equipment should be 
available as well as sustainable as agreed to and identified in the equipment support plan. 
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The appropriate CinC has now become the IPT’s customer for the 
availability and activity levels for the equipment.  Once the development, technical risk-
reduction and acceptance into service are complete, IPT control is transferred to the 
Defense Logistics Organization. 
h. In-Service 
During this phase, the IPT transfers to the Chief of Defense Logistics 
(CDL) organization.  The designated equipment support branch, which was a part of the 
IPT from the initial concept phase, now leads the IPT, which would be significantly 
smaller at this point.  The existing IPT will be responsible to incremental technology 
acquisition, minor upgrades, and refits in accordance with the project’s TMLP and will 
require additional project management resources with the Defense Procurement Agency 
or elsewhere as necessary. 
i. Disposal 
The IPT is also responsible for coming up with and carrying out plans for 
the disposal of the equipment.  The most efficient and effective means of disposal are 
needed and should comply with national and international safety and environmental 
legislation.  This could mean sale, recycling or destruction of all or part of the equipment. 
5. Resources for Defense 
The government allocates money to the MOD and the Armed Forces every year in 
what is known as the Public Expenditure Survey (PES).  In the spring, the MOD informs 
the Treasury of the probable cost in cash of the programmes it wants to carry out over the 
next three financial years.  The officials of both agencies carry out detailed discussions 
over several months, until final decisions are collectively taken by the Cabinet Ministers.  
The Chancellor of the Exchequer then announces the results for all departments in his 
budget statement in late November or early December.  The budget set for the first year is 
a fixed cash sum, while the cash totals for the second and third years are firm plans that 




D. THE UNITED STATES DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM 
1. The US Department of Defense 
The United States Department of Defense (DoD) was created with the passage of 
the National Defense Act of 1947.  The Secretary of Defense heads the Department and 
exercises authority over the three services.  Figure 3-7 shows the overall view of the DoD 
with the warfighting elements shown by the Unified Commands for each theater.  Within 
the Department, the three organizations involved in acquisition are the Navy, Army and 
the Air Force.  Other agencies that perform supporting roles to defense acquisitions are 
the Defense Contracting Management Agency (DCMA), which provides contract 
administration for the DoD, and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), which 
provides audit support for other defense agencies and all the services. 
 
Figure 3-7 Department of Defense Warfighting Elements 
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The primary role of organizing, training and equipping the military is vested in 
each service.  Every service is headed by a Service Secretary who is a political appointee 
nominated by the president and approved by Congress.  All Service Secretaries report to 
the Secretary of Defense directly.  Shown in Figure 3-8 is the organizational structure of 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).  A deputy secretary and several 
undersecretaries, who have significant influence in acquisition, assist the Secretary.  But 
the one responsible for acquisition matters within the OSD is the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD (AT&L)). 
 
Figure 3-8 Office of the Secretary of Defense 
 
2. The Requirements Generation Process 
 The process of determining the US DoD’s future military needs, known as the 
Requirements Generation Process, is prescribed under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Instructions 3170.01B (CJCSI 3170.01B), which sets the policies for the 
requirements generation system. The CJCSI 3170.01B provides policies for developing, 
reviewing, validating, and approving Mission Need Statements (MNSs), Operational 
Requirements Documents (ORDs), and Capstone Requirements Documents (CRDs) as 
required; delegates oversight authority for the requirements generation system to the Vice 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assisted by the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council (JROC) and members of the Joint Staff; and provides guidelines for the conduct 
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of requirements and program reviews at each milestone for Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAPs) prior to their being forwarded for Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) 
review, and Major Automated Information System (MAIS) acquisition programs prior to 
being forwarded to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, 
Communications and Intelligence (C3I)) or appropriate component acquisition executive 
and JROC special interest programs (13: p. 1).  
 One of the three principal parts of the Defense Department’s decision support 
systems, the requirements generation system provides information regarding the future 
mission needs of its operating commands.  Requirements generation is composed of four 
phases: 1) definition, 2) documentation, 3) validation, and 4) approval (13: p. B-1).  In 
the definition phase, the Commanders in Chief or the components conduct a Mission 
Area Analysis (MAA) or Mission Need Analysis (MNA) that will define, analyze, 
evaluate, and justify the development of a requirements document.  In the documentation 
phase, the DoD component formally prepares and reviews the necessary documents to 
support the mission need defined in the first phase.  The Mission Need Statement (MNS) 
is a statement of the operational capability requirement written in broad operational 
terms. The moment the MNS is validated after a formal review process, it means that a 
non-material solution cannot satisfy the need and consideration of a new concept/system 
material solution is made.  An Analysis of Alternatives (AOA), which bridges the MNS 
and the Operational Requirements Document (ORD), is conducted through studies and 
concept exploration.  The ORD transposes the MNS into more specific performance 
characteristics and provides the operational factors or parameters like reliability and 
maintainability, suitability, speed, durability, size, weight, etc., including thresholds and 
desired outcomes.  The ORD provides the requirements for the Acquisition Management 
System and the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS), and links the 
MNS to the acquisition process.  In the approval phase, the concurrence of the approval 
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Figure 3-9 Current Requirements and Acquisition Interface 
 
                                        Source: From Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions 3170.01B 
 
3. The DoD Acquisition System 
 As mentioned above, the DoD uses three decision support systems to manage the 
department.  These are: (1) the Requirements Generation Process; (2) the Planning, 
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS); and (3) the Acquisition Management 
System.  The three systems interact with each other even as each operates independently.  
The products coming out of the three decision support systems become the basis for 
program execution and product delivery.  There is overlapping among the support 
systems and this facilitates the acquisition system to deliver timely and cost effective 
systems (26: p. 4-35). 
  a. The Planning Programming and Budgeting System 
  The PPBS traces its roots in 1962 when then Defense Secretary Robert 
McNamara developed and instituted this unique system to link strategic planning 
activities to the budget.  It provides the mechanism to manage resource allocation in the 
DoD.  Planning, the responsibility of USD (Policy) is the first phase of the process and 
determines the capabilities required to carry out the US national security strategy and the 
defense resources available.  Programming translates the results of the planning phase 
into a rational six-year program within available resources.  Programming is the 
responsibility of the OSD’s Program Analysis and Evaluation Office.  Then budgeting, 
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the responsibility of the OSD Comptroller, transforms the program into annual budgets 
for the service in Congressional appropriation structure.  When the budget issues caused 
by the Services’ Budget Estimate Submission (BES) are resolved, the OSD issues 
program budget decisions and the DoD budget is included in the President’s Budget, and 
submitted to Congress. 
b. The Acquisition Management System 
The DoD Acquisition Management System is governed by three key 
documents, which serve as guides to the defense acquisition business.  The first is the 
DoD Directive 5000.1, the Defense Acquisition System, provides broad policy and 
principles for all acquisition programs.  It also identifies the key officials and panels for 
managing the system. The DoD Directive 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition 
System, establishes the framework for translating mission needs into stable, affordable, 
and well-managed acquisition programs.  The other regulation is the DoDR 5000.2, 
Mandatory Procedure for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPS) and Major 
Automated Information System Acquisition Programs (MAIS).  The 5000.2-R provides 
detailed policies and procedures to guide the development and production of major 
programs of the DoD.  These three documents have recently been cancelled and replaced 
by an interim guidance issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DUSD), Paul 
Wolfowitz on October 30, 2002.  The intent of the interim guidelines is to rapidly deliver 
affordable, sustainable capability that meets the warfighter’s needs by creating an 
acquisition policy environment that fosters efficiency, flexibility, creativity and 
innovation.  Essentially, the interim guidelines establish a simplified and flexible 
approach for managing acquisition programs and also provides for a simplified and 
flexible management framework for translating mission needs. Three principles govern 
the operation of the defense acquisition system before the new guidance and these are: 
• Translate operational needs into stable, sustainable, and affordable 
programs; 
• Acquire quality products; and 
• Organize for efficiency and effectiveness. 
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A fourth principle would be “to create an acquisition environment that 
fosters efficiency, creativity, flexibility and innovation” (21). 
The four phases in the current US DoD Acquisition System are: (1) 
Concept and Technology Development; (2) System Development and Demonstration; (3) 
Production and Deployment; and (4) Operations and Support.  As the program advances 
through the phases, it must pass decision points called Milestone Decision Points 
(Milestone A to C).  At every milestone, the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) will 
make a determination as to whether the system is programmatically and technologically 
ready for the next phase.  For Major Defense Acquisitions, the Defense Acquisition 
Board (DAB) is the MDA.  One primary difference between the current system and the 
previous ones is that the program can enter acquisition at any decision point or phase 
provided that the stated entrance criteria are satisfied.  Another is that the emphasis is 
now on evolutionary development where the major consideration is the maturity of the 
technology so that the system can be delivered to the warfighters as fast as possible.  The 
system is then further developed in blocks as technology matures.  Shown in Figure 3-10 
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 Source:  From Operation of the Defense Acquisition System  
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4. The Defense Acquisition Structure 
 As mentioned earlier, the USD (AT&L), also known as the Defense Acquisition 
Executive (DAE), is the one responsible for acquisition matters within the DoD.  He sets 
acquisition policy and manages the acquisition system.  The position of Service 
Acquisition Executive (SAE) was also created in the Services and to create “short lines of 
command,” the Program Executive Officer (PEO) structure was formed with four levels 
of management.  The lines of communication between the SAE and the program manager 
(PM) are limited to two as shown in Figure 3-11 (26: p. 4-22).   
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acquisition of systems and providing logistics support fall under subordinate Naval 
Systems Commands.  Among those are the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), the 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR), the Naval Sea Systems   
Command (NAVSEA), and the Marine Corps Systems Command.  The Army and the Air 
Force have their materiel commands. 
5. Acquisition Planning in the US DoD 
a. Introduction 
There is no country in the world that approximates the United States in the 
aspect of expansiveness of the defense establishment in terms of force size, defense 
spending, number of systems, procurement actions or any other comparative measure. 
Hence, it is quite difficult to compare the US defense establishment with any other 
country, including those that have the largest economies in the free world. 
 Even so, it must be pointed out that most countries essentially conduct the 
acquisition process in much the same way or procedure: (1) identification of the 
requirement; (2) definition or analysis of alternatives; (3) conduct of feasibility studies or 
concept exploration; and (4) design, development, test, production and fielding of the 
system.  Organizational structures are a little different but there is always an acquisition 
organizational structure designed to address the execution of acquisition programs, 
especially for major defense acquisitions. 
 It has been said that, “failing to plan is planning to fail.” This is a truism 
that still rings true today and will continue to ring true in the future.  This particularly 
applies to military organizations.  While the Philippine defense establishment conducts 
planning of its acquisitions, it does so with a lot of limitations.  It doesn’t have a single 
document that could be construed as an acquisition plan but provides elements of an 
acquisition plan as it goes through an acquisition. 
 On the other hand, acquisition planning in the US defense establishment is 
required under the Part 7 of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR); The Defense 
FAR Supplement (DFARS); Interim Guidance on the defense acquisition system; and 
several other regulations and instructions as they apply to the different services of the 
defense establishment. 
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 The acquisition plan is quite an important tool since it permits the 
participants in the planning of an acquisition to establish an approach logically and 
systematically to address a government need or requirement.  It also allows the 
participants to anticipate problems that may arise and provide for actions to avoid or 
mitigate such problems.  
 The primary responsibility for writing the acquisition plan falls under the 
program manager with the assistance of the IPTs.  The program manager seeks the 
expertise and input from the various functional activities involving the acquisition 
process in the preparation of the plan.  Thus, good coordination with other team members 
is particular important in developing an appropriate acquisition strategy or approach. 
Normally, the most effective plans are a result of good team effort. 
b. Preparation and Approval (1: pp. 10-11) 
The approval of the acquisition plan is obtained through the utilization of a 
five-phase preparation process. These are drafting, consultation, resolution, local 
signature and external approval as required. Necessarily, the amount of time required to 
finish one phase is dependent on the complexity of the particular acquisition. 
1. The first step is to figure out the plan then document it using 
the format and content assistance provided under FAR Part 7. Those involved in carrying 
out the acquisition should be brought together early in the process to discuss the issues 
that need to be addressed in the acquisition plan. The acquisition plan should then be 
drafted by either letting team members draft sections of the plan that fall under their 
expertise or assign one individual to draft the entire plan, who may then contact other 
team members as necessary for assistance. What’s important is that all members of the 
team should contribute their expertise to the plan; 
2. The consultation phase is the next step. The agency may have 
developed a process to efficiently obtain the required coordination and inputs to the plan 
preparation. Those who review the plan can provide applicable rules and regulations as 
well as specific phrasing to make the statements in the plan clearer and more 
understandable. 
51 
3. The resolution phase includes all the important comments that 
need to be resolved. The resolution may be done through the concurrence of the program 
office; through agreement by the reviewer with the position of the program office; or by 
agreeing to disagree on the issue and elevating it to higher approving authorities for 
resolution. 
4. After adequate resolution of all issues and comments, the 
program manager and the contracting officer sign and date the plan. The names and 
signatures of the required signers are added to the cover page. 
5. The last phase involves the approval of the acquisition plan. 
The approved plan is then returned to the agency concerned or the contracting officer for 
incorporation in the official contract file. 
If changes are required or requested to the acquisition plan by the 
reviewing authorities, the changes are accomplished through the incorporation of change 
pages. 
 c. Contents of the Acquisition Plan as Prescribed under the FAR 
 The specific contents of an acquisition plan varies depending on the 
nature, circumstances, and stage of an acquisition but, in accordance with FAR Subpart 
7.105, the standard plan that the US defense establishment adheres to has the following 
format: 
a. Acquisition Background and Objectives 
1. Statement of Need 
2. Applicable conditions 
i.  Requirements for compatibility with existing or future systems or 
programs. 
ii. Any known cost, schedule, and capability or performance 
constraints. 
3. Cost 
i.   Life-cycle cost 
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ii. Design-to-cost 
iii. Application of should cost 
4. Capability or performance 
5. Delivery or performance-period requirements 
6. Trade-offs 
7. Risks 
8. Acquisition Streamlining 
i.  Encourage industry participation by using draft solicitations, 
conferences and other means of stimulating industry involvement. 
ii. Select and tailor only the necessary and cost-effective 
requirements. 
iii. State the time frame for identifying which of the standards and 
specification shall become mandatory. 
b. Plan of Action 
1. Sources 
2. Competition 
3. Source-selection procedures 
4. Contracting considerations 
5. Budgeting and funding 
6. Product or service descriptions 
7. Priorities, allocations, and allotments 
8. Contractor versus government performance 
9. Inherently governmental functions 
10. Management information requirements 
11. Make or buy 
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12. Test and Evaluation 
13. Logistics considerations 
14. Government-furnished property 
15. Government-furnished information 
16. Environmental and energy conservation objectives 
17. Security considerations 
18. Contract administration 
19. Other considerations 
20. Milestones for the acquisition cycle 
21. Identification of participants in the acquisition plan preparation 
These are the basic contents of the acquisition plan as prescribed under the 
FAR and DFARS, which is applicable to any kind or type of acquisition.  The FAR 
provides for applicable instructions on the accomplishment of the contents of the 
acquisition plan.  Essentially, the contents as prescribed, does provide more than 
adequate information for an acquisition plan to demonstrate that the following are 
accomplished: 
1.   The government will get what it needs, when it is needed, within the 
established cost objectives; 
2.   Sufficient and appropriate funds are available and obtainable; 
3. A sound and equitable business arrangement is planned; 
4. Risks due to concurrent development/production are managed; 
5. The national goals of competition and small business utilization are 
supported; and, 




d. A Checklist for Planners 
Defense acquisition planning in the US provides for a structured and well-
defined process for accomplishing the plan and obtaining its approval.  However, 
having a checklist can be very helpful in facilitating its completion.   Below are 
checklists for those who prepare the plan and its reviewers (1: pp. 14-15). 
1. For Preparers: 
-    Hold a kickoff meeting with the program office team 
- Plan first, and then document the plan – the small stuff 
becomes easier when the big strategy is figured out. 
- Get the help of experts on the staff when you need it. 
- Give a clear overall non-technical description of the program.  
Expect those who will read the plan to be totally unfamiliar with your program. 
- Ensure the plan is consistent with the strategy and highlight the 
difference. 
- Include the disposition of recommendations in appropriate 
portions of the plan. 
- Use spell check programs and have your team perform a 
thorough quality check. 
- Use a guide in preparing the plan. 
- Use the team to accomplish regulatory research needed to fully 
understand the acquisition planning issues to be included in the plan. 
- Explain in sufficient detail any program or contract funding 
changes. 
- Don’t leave out discussion of contract options. 
- Don’t forget that acronyms are meaningless for those who 
don’t know what they mean. 
- Indicate the reasons for a topic that is non-applicable. 
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- Don’t start the consultation phase until you and your team feel 
the plan is truly complete. 
2. For Reviewers 
- Provide comments that are specific and can be acted upon. 
- Call the program manager, contracting officer, or central focal 
point for acquisition plans if you have questions during the review. 
- Clearly identify the page, section, paragraph, and line to which 
your comment applies. 
- Give complete regulation cites when applicable. 
- Provide specific alternative wording if original phrase is 
unclear or ambiguous. 
- Remember that the guide is not a directive.   
-   Remember that your goal is to help the program manager put 
together a successful acquisition program plan. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a general description of the systems, processes, and 
organization of the defense acquisition establishments of Germany, United Kingdom and 
the United States.  It also described acquisition planning as practiced in the US defense 
establishment as prescribed by FAR part 7.105.  What one can conclude from the 
literature review for this chapter is that the defense acquisition systems of the three 
countries are intended to provide their respective military with defense systems that 
would give their armed forces superiority.  This is especially true in the case of the US 
military, which for a long time advocated revolutionary acquisition and development. 
This chapter also found that there is a growing trend among the countries studied 
to move towards evolutionary acquisition and this is embodied in their new guidance or 
regulations.  This trend is obviously being driven by rising acquisition costs, the desire to 
rapidly provide the capability to the warfighter that meets the warfighter needs, and 
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provide the best value for the government.  The three countries also commonly use 
Integrated Product or Project Teams (IPTs) in their acquisition programs. 
Defense acquisition planning has been deemed important enough to be included 
in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR).  The FAR provides enough guidance or 
instructions to prepare and accomplish an acquisition plan as soon as the agency need is 
identified.   However, the planning requirements could become too complex, particularly 
for major defense acquisitions, with some estimates having over 100 plans developed for 
major acquisitions (36: p. 14). 
The next chapter will present an analysis of acquisition processes in the AFP vis-
à-vis that of other countries, giving particular emphasis on acquisition planning.  It will 
identify the issues relating to acquisition planning in the AFP and provide key elements 






























IV. ANALYSIS OF THE AFP ACQUISITION PLANNING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter presents an analysis of AFP acquisition planning vis-à-vis that of the 
US defense establishment.  It also provides a comparative analysis of the acquisition 
system and processes in the Philippine military with that of the US and other countries 
earlier presented in the preceding chapters.  It discusses the major issues relating to the 
policies, rules, and regulations that govern the conduct of planning for the AFPMP 
acquisitions and examines the key elements, factors and characteristics that can lead to 
more effective acquisition planning for the AFPMP based on earlier discussions in this 
research paper.   
B. ANALYSIS OF THE AFP ACQUISITION SYSTEM AND PROCESS 
 1. Background 
The long period of dependence of the AFP on US military aid immensely affected 
the development of its defense acquisition system, particularly for major defense 
programs.  Acquisition processes for MDAPs were also correspondingly inadequate.  
Without the enactment of the AFP Modernization Law, the AFP acquisition system and 
processes would have remained undeveloped.  Before the AFP Modernization Law, 
almost all acquisitions of the AFP were for operating, maintenance and support activities 
except for a few and far between equipment acquisitions. 
2. AFP Acquisition Organizational Structure 
 With the AFP Modernization Law, the defense establishment had to institute an 
acquisition system, with the attendant processes, to address the capability development 
programs for the AFPMP.  However, the review of the AFP acquisition system and the 
processes that go with it reveal that the system doesn’t have a sound organizational 
structure to support AFPMP acquisitions.  In fact, the Philippine defense establishment 
has no formalized acquisition organization that focuses on MDAPs.  What the defense 
department has are ad hoc bodies or entities to temporarily address the requirements of 
the AFPMP, which is one of the reasons why decisions are centralized for MDAPs. 
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 The PMTs start and end the AFPMP equipment acquisition process but are 
hindered by the fact that, in practice, members perform their duties on a collateral basis, 
even though SOP No. 8 provides for it being a primary duty.  They also don’t have any 
meaningful participation during the contract negotiation stage.  Second, there are only a 
few members in the team when one considers that the capability development programs 
are major defense programs of the AFP.  Third, there’s a need to professionalize the 
AFP’s personnel for acquisitions, but the DND should first have an acquisition 
workforce.  The Department of Defense doesn’t have any for major defense programs.  
The DND also doesn’t have contracting officers to formulate and administer contracts.  
Presently, the AFP has two contracting officers who have the necessary education to 
handle contracts but there is still no organization for them to carry out such duties.  Fifth, 
there is no test and evaluation (T & E) organization for independent testing of the weapon 
systems being acquired or procured.  What the AFP does is either get personnel from 
technical units or research and development offices to conduct testing and evaluation or 
to have the technical member of the PMT do the testing and evaluation management of 
the program.  Again this goes back to whether the AFP has the personnel who have T & 
E training.  The fact is the AFP has not gone far in the conduct of training, not only for 
PMT members, but also for other prospective members of the acquisition workforce like 
contracting specialists and T & E personnel. 
The defense acquisition system and processes are still evolving but the need to 
have an acquisition organization must be addressed immediately.  Commander Montañez 
recommended this in his thesis when he said that the Defense Modernization Office 
(DMO) should be upgraded to the Defense Acquisition Office responsible for all 
acquisition programs of the defense department, not only for the AFPMP (28, p. 60).  The 
process of establishing a defense acquisition organization will be a hard and tedious one 
but it has to start as soon as possible. 
3. Requirements Generation  
Requirements for the AFPMP were generated even before the AFP Modernization 
Law was enacted but the structure for requirements generation for acquisition programs 
are not well established.  The AFP’s dependence on the US for military hardware for 
decades definitely impacted development of this process.  If we compare the AFP’s 
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requirements generation process with that of other countries, we can see the limitations 
and inadequacy of the AFP process.  This poses a problem when the AFPMP should have 
been completed and the DND and AFP may have to go through another round of 
modernization law enactment.  At present, all that the AFP is doing is prioritizing its 
programmed acquisitions due to fund constraints.  The whole program itself has only one 
fourth of its original funds available in real terms because the laws relating to it didn’t 
apply a base year for funding and never accounted for inflation.  In spite of all this, the 
AFP is still expected to perform more missions that it can actually accomplish. 
4. Statutes, Guidelines, Rules, and Regulations 
The laws, guidelines, rules, and regulations pertaining to the AFPMP are limited 
to contract formation, while remaining silent after contract award (28: p. 37).  This was 
addressed in the thesis of Commander Cesar Taccad.  However, to date, there is still no 
single regulation that provides a complete and definitive guidance for major system 
acquisitions required under the AFPMP.  The fragmented and numerous statutes, rules 
and regulations on acquisition continue to hamper the implementation of the AFPMP.   
 Commander Montañez’ recommendation to establish contracting officer positions 
in the AFP to enable continuity in the acquisition process has not been addressed by the 
defense leadership so far.  Corollary to this should be the creation of other acquisition or 
contracting positions to assist the contracting officer in his job, and the necessary training 
and education attendant to performing such positions. 
4. The AFPMP Acquisition Process 
The acquisition process for the AFPMP is adequate for the purpose of procuring a 
weapon system or equipment that’s already in use by at least two other countries’ military 
or being used in the country of origin.  The AFPMP acquisition process doesn’t have to 
deal with concept exploration and system development, but only with the manufacture of 
systems already in the market or procurement of an existing system.  Unlike the UK, 
Germany and the US, which usually wants to acquire products that have not yet been 
developed and produced to give their armed forces superiority, the AFP only has to find 
something satisfactory “off-the-shelf.”  
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Still, due to the intricacies of the laws, rules and regulations, it takes 44 weeks, 
barring any problems, to complete the acquisition process from project identification to 
implementation.  The PMT’s participation is on the end points of the process, project 
identification and contract implementation.  Its members are not involved in the contract 
negotiation phase.  In Chapters II, we found that the CORs and BEPs undergo four 
reviews and validations before final approval by the SND.  The number of reviews and 
validations of the CORs and BEPs can certainly be reduced without necessarily 
sacrificing their validity.  GHQ can perform the review and validation of the CORs and 
BEPs jointly with the DND, instead of reviewing them separately.  DND may also 
delegate the responsibility of the review and validation to GHQ while retaining oversight 
functions. 
Acquisition projects have different costs associated with them and to further 
streamline the acquisition process, categorizing acquisition projects may be resorted to 
based on projected project expenditure with corresponding decision authorities 
designated for each category so that it is not always the SND who decides for all 
capability development projects. 
C. ISSUES RELATING TO AFP ACQUISITION PLANNING 
 One of the main issues affecting acquisition planning is that it is not a requirement 
in the AFP even for the capability development programs of the AFPMP.  However, 
many of the elements of an acquisition plan included in the FAR format are being 
performed by the PMTs, but not in a comprehensive and structured manner.  Yet, there is 
no overall plan that could provide the overall strategy for accomplishing an acquisition.  
What the AFPMP requirement provides for is the BEP, which is actually equivalent to a 
source selection plan in US acquisitions.  However, this is only one element of an 
acquisition plan among many.  The COR, which defines the operational and technical 
requirements of the equipment or weapon system to be procured, form the basis of an 
acquisition and is the other document required prior to the conduct of contract 
negotiation.  Nowhere in the equipment acquisition process is there mention of an 
acquisition plan required by higher headquarters.  Acquisition plans should be a 
requirement for all AFPMP projects. 
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In the thesis of Mark E. St. Moritz, he reiterated that effective acquisition 
planning is vital to the success of any business undertaking, particularly in the acquisition 
of major weapon systems within the defense department.  Considering that there are no 
coherent regulations pertaining to acquisition in the DND, one can argue that sound 
acquisition planning is the key to successful AFP acquisition programs (38: p. 1).  In the 
AFP, however, acquisition planning is performed in a sporadic and fragmented manner 
and no formal procedures or processes have been developed except for the development 
of the COR, BEP risk planning and a few other elements of an acquisition plan. 
Effective acquisition planning is highly dependent on the interaction and 
experience of the personnel involved in an acquisition but the Philippine defense 
establishment has no acquisition workforce that has the experience or training to perform 
acquisition planning for major acquisition programs like what is required under the 
capability development programs of the AFPMP.  Without an experienced acquisition 
workforce, the absence of a formal acquisition planning process could lead to situations 
of inadequate and ineffective procurement of a weapon system or equipment.  This is a 
very serious issue and can only be addressed through training and education that will take 
time to bear fruit.  The AFP had already started the process of educating and training its 
personnel, but it will take time to reap its benefits.  Contracting officers perform a crucial 
role in acquisition planning but currently, there are only two qualified contracting officers 
in the AFP.  
Corollary to acquisition planning is the development of an acquisition strategy, 
which provides the framework for an acquisition.  The development of an acquisition 
strategy has been mentioned in some of the DND and AFP regulations relating to the 
AFPMP but it is not mentioned in the SOP on project management teams for the AFPMP.  
The acquisition strategy provides the overall strategy for managing an acquisition but 
responsibility for its development is not clear.  The PMT is not responsible for it.  In a 
major acquisition in the US, a program could not proceed until an acquisition strategy has 
been approved, but in the case of the AFPMP, this isn’t clear.  This issue has to be 
addressed as well. 
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Not all of the programs in the AFPMP will be considered MDAPs and so another 
issue is that the DND has to define acquisition categories to better manage its acquisitions 
for the AFPMP.  Categorizing acquisition projects could greatly make acquisition 
planning for the AFPMP more effective and efficient.  At the moment, there is still no 
regulation regarding this matter. 
 Another major issue is the lack of an acquisition organization in the DND/AFP.  
In the review of literature, all the other countries studied had acquisition organizations 
and found them performing a crucial role in the defense organization.  In the DND, there 
are procurement organizations but are focused more on logistics, operating and 
maintenance requirements and not on acquisition of weapon systems.  Having an 
acquisition organization in the Philippine defense establishment will ensure that the 
mission needs of the warfighters would be addressed even though AFP acquisitions are 
for developed systems already. 
D. KEY ELEMENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE ACQUISITION PLAN 
 The key to an effective acquisition plan is a good acquisition strategy, which will 
guide the planners with an overall strategy to manage the plan.  This is a top-level 
description of the acquisition that should be considered and approved by the decision 
authority prior to proceeding with an acquisition.  The strategy provides the basis for 
more detailed planning and gives the decision-makers to assess whether an acquisition 
makes good business sense, effectively implements laws and policies, and reflects the 
defense leadership’s priorities. 
 Every acquisition is unique and has different requirements.  This suggests that no 
two plans are the same even for the acquisition of similar systems.  As discussed earlier, 
acquisitions for the AFPMP have an inherent difference with that of the other countries 
mentioned in this study in that projects identified for the AFPMP are developed systems 
while that of the US, UK and Germany are mostly development programs.  Thus, some of 
the elements of an acquisition plan under the FAR may not be applicable to the AFP.  
Nevertheless, the FAR format provides a comprehensive document that captures all the 
necessary requirements of an acquisition and does serve as a template of an effective 
acquisition plan.  The key elements of an effective acquisition plan are: 
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• Statement of need – this introduces the plan through a brief statement of 
the need and provides the basis for the acquisition.  It should provide a history of the 
equipment to be replaced. 
• Applicable conditions – states all the significant conditions affecting the 
acquisition to include requirements compatibility and cost, schedule, and capability or 
performance constraints. 
• Capability or performance requirements – this specifies the performance 
features or capabilities required of the system being acquired. 
• Delivery or performance-period requirements – this should describe the 
basis for establishing delivery or performance requirements including reasons for urgency 
and justifications for not having open competition. 
• Participants in the acquisition plan – this gives the people involved in the 
plan preparation and the responsibilities of each.  Contact information should be 
included. 
• Cost – Cost goals should be established for the acquisition and must have 
a rationale to support them.  Cost concepts used should be included (i.e. total ownership 
cost, should-cost). 
• Budgeting and funding – this should state how estimates were developed 
and should describe pricing methodology (i.e. parametric pricing, historical, catalogue, 
etc.).  It should also include funding by appropriation and fiscal year. 
• Alternatives – this element should discuss feasible acquisition alternatives. 
• Trade-offs – this pertains to cost/schedule/performance trade-offs and 
affordability will play a big part in the process. 
• Risks – this should discuss cost, schedule and technical risks and the plan 
to manage such risks. 
• Milestone charts – this should include a chart depicting the acquisition 
objectives including those for requirements approval, submission of specifications, 
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contract award, updates that should be in conjunction with decision reviews, and logistics 
milestones. 
• Business considerations – this should includes inter-agency cooperation, 
which is quite important in AFP acquisitions where other agencies have a say in the 
acquisition as is counter-trade and offsets.  Other business considerations are warranties, 
government-furnished property or information, acquisition streamlining, security 
considerations, make or buy decisions, energy and environmental considerations, the 
Self-Reliant Defense Program (SRDP) considerations, and others relevant to the plan. 
• Technical considerations – should discuss value engineering to reduce 
costs not only in production but also in the maintenance and support of the weapon 
system.  Other technical considerations are system safety, electromagnetic effects, 
frequency allocations and assignments, reliability, maintainability and quality assurance, 
conformance to open systems. 
• Test and evaluation – this is actually a part of the technical consideration 
but it is quite important that it needs to be treated as a special consideration.  This should 
describe the test program of the contractor and the government although it is focused on 
operational testing and not development testing in the case of the AFPMP. 
• Logistics consideration – it describes the contractor or agency support 
both initially and over the life of the system.  It should also describe the Integrated 
Logistics Planning to date including references to an approved Integrated Logistics 
Support (ILS) plan.  Major components, subsystems, and spare parts of the equipment 
should be identified and it should also describe how competition for these components, 
subsystems, and spare parts would be sought, promoted and sustained. 
• Plan of action for each contract – some projects may have more than one 
contract and the project team should consider the item being acquired, the estimated cost, 
the prospective sources, competition, source selection procedures, and contracting 





E. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
The chapter provided an analysis of the acquisition system of the AFP with that of 
other countries.  It showed that the Philippine defense establishment has no acquisition 
organization for weapon systems acquisition.  This has proved to be a major hurdle for 
the AFP Modernization Program.  The lack of a professional acquisition workforce is 
also a detriment and the education and training necessary to address these problems are 
enormous.  The shortcomings of the defense structure are being addressed and training of 
personnel who will be involved in the acquisition process continues.  However, an 
acquisition organization for defense acquisition programs should be instituted as soon as 
possible to address all the acquisition issues described in this chapter. 
The chapter also described the key elements of an effective acquisition plan with 
the acquisition strategy as guide to its preparation.  Acquisition plans are needed because 
planning is the key to success of an acquisition and this cannot be underscored enough.  
However, the AFP still has not required an acquisition plan for its capability development 
programs under the AFPMP. 





































V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the finding and recommendations of the study.  The 
research has so far provided pertinent information and understanding of the AFP 
Modernization Program and the laws, rules and regulations associated with it.  Chapter 
III reviewed the acquisition systems of the US, UK and Germany and provided an 
insightful comparison with that of the Philippine defense acquisition system made in 
Chapter IV.  The analytical comparison of the AFP acquisition planning practices with 
those of the US DoD was also made in Chapter IV. 
Chapter IV presented the importance and the need to perform acquisition planning 
for the AFPMP in order to effectively manage the weapon system acquisition and to 
establish a logical and systematic approach to address the defense needs or requirement.  
With the consolidation of the knowledge achieved from the research, this study in now 
presenting its conclusions and recommendations. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
In a lecture on December 12, 2002 by Brigadier General Daryll A. Scott, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Contracting, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 
Acquisition, emphasized that acquisition planning is the key to the success of an 
acquisition.  Currently, however, the AFP performs planning for its acquisitions under the 
AFPMP but does so in a fragmented manner. 
Based on the data and information presented, analyzed and interpreted in the 
preceding chapters, following are the conclusions of the study: 
1. The AFP has no single regulation that deals with acquisition planning.  
The AFP acquisition system for MDAPs itself is still evolving and developing, too 
fragmented, and inadequate to address the planning issues associated with the AFP 
Modernization Program.  It is not a requirement under current regulations. 
2. Acquisition planning as practiced in the AFP is done in a fragmented 
manner.  The elements of an acquisition plan are prepared by the PMTs but not as parts 
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of an overall plan that establishes a logical and systematic approach to addressing an AFP 
requirement.  Contract administration, for example, is not being addressed in the planning 
documents and this is a subject of two previous theses by Filipino officers. 
3. There is a lack of educated and trained personnel for the acquisition of 
weapon systems who can perform acquisition planning.  Presently, there are only two 
graduates of acquisition and contracting in the AFP although training of project team 
members is a continuing activity in the AFP to specifically address this need.  However, 
other positions need to be established and filled like contracting officers, contracting 
specialists, and other acquisition personnel. 
4. There is no defense acquisition organization that’s responsible for defense 
acquisitions.  The SND is almost always the milestone decision authority and this 
impedes efficiency.  Having an acquisition organization would provide a structure that 
would lead to the establishment and better management of the acquisition systems and 
processes needed for the AFPMP. 
5. There are no established acquisition categories for acquisition projects of 
the AFPMP.  This makes for a cumbersome process where the decision authority is 
almost always the Secretary of National Defense.  Having established acquisition 
categories will make for a more effective and efficient planning process. 
6. There is still no established education and training program within the 
Philippine defense establishment that addresses the skill requirements necessary for 
acquisition personnel to successfully pursue weapon systems acquisitions in the AFP.  
Thus, planning remains fragmented and sporadically performed. 
7. PMT membership is supposed to be a primary duty but is treated as a 
collateral duty in practice.  This affects the preparation and development of the CORs, 
BEPs, and other attendant plans for projects already identified.   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 In view of the above, the following recommendations are provided: 
 1. Revise the current IGRR to incorporate the conduct of acquisition 
planning and the preparation of acquisition plans as requirements for all major defense 
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acquisition programs.  With formalized and comprehensive procedures or processes, 
acquisitions would be more effective in addressing the requirements of the capability 
development program of the AFPMP.   
 2.  Institute formalized and structured education and training programs in the 
AFP to address the skill requirements for AFP weapon system acquisitions.  This was a 
recommendation of Commander Montañez in his thesis, but needs to be reiterated 
because of its importance (28: p. 60).  In the interim, the DND and AFP should develop 
enhanced training materials for personnel involved in acquisitions for the AFPMP. 
 3. The Department of National Defense should commission a study to 
establish a defense acquisition organization that would be responsible for all acquisitions 
of the defense department, not only for the AFP Modernization Program.  
 4. Revise the IGRR to establish acquisition categories and provide for 
decision authorities for each category to improve efficiency and effectiveness in the 
acquisition process for the AFP. 
 5. Properly implement and manage the Project Management Teams.  Team 
members are supposed to be on detached service to the major service modernization 
office and performing duties of major responsibility.  As such, they should be doing their 
job as PMT members and not performing other collateral duties.  Major Service 
commands must provide better control to ensure that regulations are adhered to with 
regard to the PMTs. 
 6. Adopt the FAR acquisition plan format as a first step to the preparation of 
an acquisition plan.  Later, develop an acquisition planning guide by the AFPMP 
Management Office as a standard to be followed by the PMTs.  
D. SUMMARY AND REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
Is acquisition planning as currently practiced in the AFP adequate to meet the 
requirements of the AFP Modernization Program? 
In Chapter II, the study found that the AFP does not prepare an acquisition plan 
but it does require the preparation of the Circular of Requirements and the Bid and 
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Evaluation Plan by the PMTs.  These are fragments of an acquisition plan but are not the 
plan itself.  Even the preparation of an acquisition strategy is not included in the duties 
and responsibilities of the PMTs and there is no document to show who is responsible for 
the preparation and approval acquisition strategy although it was part of a number of 
regulations and manuals.   
Considering the importance of the AFPMP projects, it is quite important that a 
comprehensive acquisition plan be prepared instead of just fragments or parts of a plan in 
order to ensure a more logical and systematic approach to satisfying a government need.  
As stated in the study, acquisition planning is key to the success of an acquisition.   
The acquisition planning practices of the AFP leaves some of the key elements of 
an acquisition plan out.  One example is the lack of guidance on post-award contract 
administration.  Currently, this is not addressed in acquisition planning.  Test and 
evaluation is also another key element that is not given its due importance although it is 
part of the BEP.   The lack of educated and trained personnel and fragmented laws, rules 
and regulations are also hampering acquisition planning.  Thus, it is evident that 
acquisition planning practices in the AFP are inadequate to address the requirements of 
the AFP Modernization Program. 
2. First Subsidiary Question 
What laws, rules and regulations impact acquisition planning in the AFPMP? 
 The AFP Modernization Law or Republic Act Number 7898, and Congress’ Joint  
Resolution Number 28 provides the authority for the AFP to plan and obtain its weapon 
systems and other equipment for its modernization program.  But the main document that 
impact acquisition planning in the AFP is DND Circular Number 1, or the IGRR.  The 
IGRR provide the details on the objectives of the statute and also defines the policies for 
the implementation of the capability development portion of the program.  The most 
significant issuance that impacts AFP acquisition planning after the IGRR is AFP SOP 
No. 8, which prescribes the functions, composition, organization, and duties and 
responsibilities of the PMTs and also prescribes the policies and procedures for the other 
PMTs.  The PMTs are the ones actually doing the planning with their preparation of the 
CORs and the BEPs.  They are also responsible for the risk management plan and are 
72 
required to perform a number of other functions.  The PMTs perform the beginning and 
end of acquisition planning in the AFP because they implement the contract after its 
award, even though they have no significant role in contract negotiation.  All the other 
laws, rules and regulations were mentioned in Chapter II have varying affects on AFP 
acquisition planning, but not as much as the IGRR and SOP No. 8. 
3. Second Subsidiary Question 
How is acquisition planning practiced in the AFP and how does it differ from 
acquisition planning for the AFPMP? 
Acquisition planning in the AFP starts from the Major Services through the 
identification of a mission need and the corresponding requirements through its 
respective major service weapons board.  The requirements are then forwarded to the 
AFP weapons board for review and validation.  This is recommended to the Chief of 
Staff, AFP who subsequently endorses the requirement to the SND.  Once it is approved, 
the acquisition begins and planning for the acquisition starts.   However, the US 
government normally provides the requirements through FMS until the abrogation of the 
US Bases Treaty. 
The former process is quite different now with the advent of the AFP 
Modernization Law.  The acquisition planning process is more structured than before and 
continues to be developed and improved.  As mentioned earlier, the project is identified 
by the major service, which also prepares the required documents, the COR and the BEP.  
The PMTs are required to conduct market research and prepare other plans.  However, 
this is as far as the acquisition planning is done in the AFP.  It is still fragmented with no 
comprehensive acquisition plan required from the PMTs except for the COR and the 
BEP. 
4. Third Subsidiary Question 
What are the attendant problems associated with current acquisition planning 
practices and how does it affect the AFPMP? 
There is no requirement for an acquisition plan for the AFPMP.  The current 
planning practices are fragmented and the requirements are not part of a structured and 
formal acquisition plan.  There is a lack of skilled workforce or personnel who can 
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conduct acquisition planning for the AFP.  Also, the absence of an acquisition 
organization impacts acquisition planning.  Other problems noted in the conclusions of 
this study affect the AFPMP negatively. 
5. Fourth Subsidiary Question 
How is acquisition planning practiced in the US DoD? 
The US defense establishment has been performing acquisition planning since 
1984.  As such, it has already developed its acquisition planning process as described in 
Chapter III.  From requirements generation to actual production and fielding, the US 
DoD has a much more mature planning process than the Philippines.  It is even a part of 
the FAR (Part 7) and provides the format to prepare an acquisition plan.  The services 
also have their respective planning guides to help the Program Managers prepare an 
effective plan.  The US DoD has the organizational structure, policies and skilled 
personnel to do acquisition plans although they have their own problems.  Still, their 
regulations on acquisition planning provide them with enough guidance to prepare an 
effective plan.  They also have established acquisition categories that provide for more 
efficiency in the planning process. 
6. Fifth Subsidiary Question 
What changes, if any, can be made to appropriate laws and regulations to make 
acquisition planning more responsive to the requirements of the AFPMP? 
As stated in the recommendations portion of this chapter, acquisition plans should 
be made a requirement and incorporated in the IGRR through a revision.  Since the 
majority of the capability development projects of the AFPMP could be considered 
MDAPs, having an acquisition plan will significantly improve its success.   Adopting the 
FAR acquisition plan format will have to be included in the IGRR as well.  The AFP can 
then modify it later to fit an acquisition project.  Another recommendation is the 
establishment of acquisition categories by the SND to improve efficiencies in the 
planning process.  This could be done by a separate document or through an amendment 
to the IGRR.  Finally, DND can formulate a comprehensive defense acquisition 
regulation (DAR) that will cover all aspects of an acquisition plan from requirements 
definition, project identification, and contract negotiation to procurement and disposal. 
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E. RECOMMENDED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 Some suggested areas for further research include: 
1. A study on the development of an acquisition plan for major weapon 
systems. 
2. The importance of Information Technology (IT) tools to improve 
acquisition planning in the AFP. 
3. The need for IT tools to reduce cycle time in AFP Modernization Program 
acquisitions. 
4. A study on the appropriate acquisition organization for the Department of 
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